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Kenya and the International Criminal Court: 
Politics, the Election, and the Law* 
 
By Susanne D. Mueller  
 
“The world is watching Kenya and this court…. We will not fail.” (October 27, 2009)1  
“We know this is not a political process but we are faced with a political challenge 
where both the President and his Deputy are the accused.” (June 23, 2013)2  
 
Introduction 
Why did Kenya initially join the International Criminal Court (ICC) but then attempt to 
undermine it once the ICC began to investigate the 2007–2008 post-election 
violence3 and its six alleged masterminds? And, what does this have to do with 
Kenya’s 2013 election? Political economy theories of treaty ratification offer no 
adequate answer. Instead, I advance an explanation related to changes in political 
risk, particularly in systems where the rule of law and institutions are weak and 
malleable.4 I argue that as post-ratification political risks for countries and 
defendants in such situations increase, compliance is likely to be jeopardized. Kenya 
                                            
* Thanks to Ron Rogowski, Phil Keefer, and Millard Long for very useful comments and to 
Stephen Chaudoin for sharing and discussing his article before publication. 
1 Quotation from Luis Moreno Ocampo, former Chief Prosecutor of the ICC in Peter Opiyo, “The 
ICC Opens Kenya Case,” The Standard, November 29, 2009.  
2 Quotation from Claudia Perdomo, head of the ICC’s Outreach Unit in Oliver Mathenge, 
“Kenya’s Cases a Big Challenge, Says ICC,” The Star, June 29, 2013. 
3 For a discussion of the factors behind the violence, see Susanne D. Mueller, “The Political 
Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, 2 (2008), 185–210. Other studies 
include Nic Cheeseman and Dan Branch, eds., “Special Issue: Election Fever: Kenya’s Crisis,” 
Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, 2 (July 2008); Peter Kagwanja and Roger Southall, eds., 
“Special Issue: Kenya’s Uncertain Democracy: The Electoral Crisis of 2007,” Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 27, 3 (July 2009); Karuti Kanyinga and Duncan Okello, eds., Tensions 
and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections (Nairobi: Institute for 
Development Studies [IDS], University of Nairobi, 2010).  
4 Here political risk is the independent variable, the rule of law the intervening variable, and 
Kenya’s response to the ICC, the dependent variable. According to the World Bank’s rule of law 
index, Kenya is at the 22nd percentile. See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 
index.aspx?fileName=c116.pdf#reports. Also see David Smith, “Kofi Annan: ‘African Justice is 
Weak’,” October 10, 2013. 
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and the defendants charged by the ICC altered their response to the ICC as their 
risk of being indicted, going to trial, and even being convicted rose. The ICC began 
to examine the Kenya situation in 2008-9, well before the 2013 election. This 
constituted a potential risk that continued to increase once the ICC received 
permission to start a formal investigation and the cases progressed. I analyze the 
various means used to challenge and undermine the ICC, explaining how and why 
winning Kenya’s March 2013 presidential race became key to avoiding The Hague.  
The election came into play when two of the ICC indictees, Uhuru Kenyatta, a 
Kikuyu, and William Ruto, a Kalenjin, decided to run for president and deputy 
president. It was an opportunistic alliance of convenience as the ICC had accused 
both individuals of masterminding the 2007-2008 ethnically targeted violence in each 
other’s communities. Ironically, this union, the negative ethnicity that accompanied it 
and the ICC’s involvement may also have acted as a partial deterrent against 
violence in 2013. Winning the election was part of a larger defense strategy to 
undercut the ICC by seizing political power, flexing it to deflect the ICC, and opening 
up the possibility of not showing up for trial if all else failed. The strategy entailed 
using a series of delaying tactics to ensure that the ICC trials would not start until 
after the defendants had won the election and gained power at the highest level. The 
tactics ranged from mobilizing international organizations against the ICC, making 
numerous, sometimes frivolous, legal challenges deliberately designed to delay the 
court, and the intimidation of potential witnesses allegedly by defense sympathizers 
and go betweens,5 to keep them from assisting the ICC. The tactics were part of a 
                                            
5 Evidence of this has been piling up. Most recently the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber issued an 
arrest warrant for Walter Baraza, a Kenyan journalist, who has been charged with “corruptly 
influencing or attempting to influence persons he thought were witnesses for William Ruto.” Mr. 
Baraza, formerly an “intermediary for the Prosecution,” is charged with “allegedly being and still acting 
in furtherance of a criminal scheme devised by a circle of officials with in the Kenya administration.” 
See ICC-CPI-20131002-PR 948, October 2, 2013, http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/ 
default.aspx/Kenya. The ICC also has presenting allegations concerning witness tampering, bribery 
and murder in the Uhuru Kenyatta case. See ICC-01/09-02/11-848-Red, November 11, 2013, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx/Kenya. Also, witnesses interviewed by the 
Guardian, say they have been bribed and intimidated by “the backers of Ruto.” See Catrina Stewart, 
“ICC on Trial with Kenya’s Elite Amid Claims of Bribery and Intimidation,” The Guardian, October 1, 
2013. In a September 9, 2013 press conference before the start of Ruto’s trial, Fatou Bensouda, the 
ICC’s Chief Prosecutor (CP) said that the intimidation, bribery and tampering with witnesses “is 
ongoing and is happening” with those involved, “going to great lengths to cover their identity.…” 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NthZDtptAVs&list=PLz3-Py_E3klBv8_SkNTSVdAtYHZHtlwyh 
&index=17 (last accessed October 1, 2013). Other allegations in the same vein include claims by the 
ICC’s Chief Prosecutor that Witness 4 in the Uhuru Kenyatta case was bribed by “representatives” of 
the defendant. See Nzau and Oliver Mathenge, “Kenya: ‘Uhuru Men Bribed Witness 4’- ICC Chief 
Prosecutor,” The Star, February 28, 2013. Earlier, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber warned Katwa Kigen, 
initially the lawyer for both Ruto and Sang, not to disclose confidential information on witnesses, 
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larger design to undercut the ICC. Demonizing opponents, politicizing ethnicity, and 
attacking the ICC as a tool of the west both before and during the presidential 
campaign served both this end and victory in the election. Once they won the 
election, Kenyatta and Ruto introduced another tactic: asking for concessions based 
on their political power. This included pleas to drop their cases and not be physically 
present at trial.   
One might claim, alternatively, that Kenya was being cooperative, with its 
defendants simply fighting against ICC cases they believed were flawed or meritless, 
or using perfectly legal tactics to try to quash their indictments. And indeed, Kenya 
and its defendants have tried to appear cooperative and to portray their defense 
practices as normal; but this is not the whole story.6 
The sequence of events raises serious questions about the fate of 
international human rights treaties and international criminal justice not only in 
Kenya, where institutions and the rule of law are weak, but also about the future of 
democracy there. My argument invokes Douglas North’s7 understanding of how 
politics works. As informal enforcement mechanisms, including sanctions and 
rewards, jeopardize compliance, formal legal institutions and instruments like 
treaties can be undermined. The ICC, in particular, might well be thwarted as 
member countries and individuals respond to changing political incentives that differ 
                                                                                                                                       
something Luis Moreno Ocampo, the ICC’s CP alleged he had done. See “ICC Warns Lawyer over 
Witnesses,” Daily Nation, November 11, 2011. Before that, an ICC official warned suspects found to 
be intimidating witnesses or victims of possible sanctions or arrest warrants. See Evelyn Kwamboka, 
“Ocampo Six Warned Not to Intimidate Witnesses,” The Standard, November 18, 2011. As early as 
2010 and before, the ICC had complained of witness intimidation, requested government assistance, 
and threated warrants against those involved. More recently Maina Kiai, a Kenyan human rights 
activist and supporter of the ICC alleged that State House itself was involved in threats against him. 
See Jennifer Muiruri, “Kiai Accuses State Hour of Threats,” Daily Nation, September 20, 2013. 
Numerous other examples could be cited including fn 113 below.   
6 Fatou Bensouda, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor has said, “Kenya is the most challenging situation 
our office has had to deal with,” adding that “she deplored the lack of cooperation from the Kenya 
government.” “ICC Will Not Drop Charges Against Uhuru Kenyatta: Bensouda,” Africa Review, March 
21, 2013; Maina Kamore, “How State Gagged Witnesses,” The Star, October 27, 2012. In contrast to 
the prosecution, the lawyers for the defense have argued that the cases against their clients were 
flawed from their inception with the prosecution relying on individuals who lied, withheld exculpatory 
evidence, and hampered their defense by not releasing evidence in a timely fashion or by introducing 
new evidence and witnesses at the last minute. 
7 Douglas North, “Economic Change through Time,” American Economic Review 84, 3 (June 
1994), 359–68. 
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from those of the court. Changes in political risk and weakness in the rule of law turn 
out to be more important than legal ratifications in understanding compliance.8 
I argue that political context matters and question assertions that formal rules 
are becoming more important in Africa, as claimed, for example, by Posner and his 
coauthors.9 In spite of the improvements they cite, departures from the rule of law 
are more common, particularly when political risks are high. In Kenya, as elsewhere 
in Africa, the rule of law still is weak, politicized, and hard to enforce; individuals 
often are sanctioned for trying. Hathaway convincingly argues that countries in such 
situations incur low costs in ratifying treaties.10 This, in turn, invites non-compliance 
of varying degrees and attempts to ignore or undermine the law and other formal 
rules. This is business as usual in Kenya. The public is used to politicians acting as if 
they were the law and not subject to it.11The difference here is that the interactions 
between Kenya and the ICC are playing out on an international stage with different 
consequences, including the possibility of warrants and sanctions. This may explain 
the duality of Kenya’s and the defendants’ nominal cooperation while acting to 
undermine the court. The defendants have showed up at the ICC as required. The 
government has allowed the ICC to conduct in country investigations and set up an 
office. But the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, argues this is the ICC’s 
most difficult case ever, accusing Kenya of spying on its staff, not honoring promises 
for documents and interviews with officials, interfering with witnesses, politicizing the 
law, and using frivolous delaying tactics to postpone trial.  
My discussion of the Kenya situation, amidst all of the above dualities, 
contributes to understanding the interplay between law and politics, including 
changes in political risk. It is a subject lawyers, judges, and many scholars often 
mistakenly ignore or downplay, to their detriment. Analyses of ratification and 
compliance using large data sets fail to explain the dynamics of how both work at the 
country level or the incentives guiding decision making. My examination of the 
Kenya case below provides some answers and insights, possibly applicable 
                                            
8 Recent examples are Museveni’s and Kenyatta’s attack on the ICC at the latter’s presidential 
inauguration in April 2013.  
9 Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young, “The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa,” 
Journal of Democracy 18, 3 (July 2007), 126–40; Eric Kramon and Daniel Posner, “Kenya’s New 
Constitution,” Journal of Democracy 22, 2 (April 2011), 89–103. 
10 Oona A. Hathaway, “The Cost of Commitment,” John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, 
Economics, and Public Policy Working Papers 273 (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2003), 15–18. 
Using quantitative data, Hathaway contrasts democracies with non-democracies, which still share 
important characteristics with fledgling democracies like Kenya, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu 
/lepp_papers/273. 	  
11 Attempts to subvert judicial reforms since the passage of Kenya’s 2010 constitution continue 
in spite of formal legal changes to institutionalize the separation of power between various branches 
of government. 
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elsewhere. It also demonstrates the salience of political power and winning elections 
to undermine the law. 
 
Background 
In December 2007, Kenya experienced a contested election. Following the 
announcement of President Kibaki’s win, violence broke out in various parts of the 
country. The Rift Valley was the epicenter of the post-election violence largely 
against Kikuyu supporters of President Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU in 
the North Rift and retaliatory violence by Kikuyus against Luo and other supporters 
of Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in the Central Rift Valley as 
well as in other parts of the country. The result of this ethnically targeted violence, 
later termed crimes against humanity was over 1,200 dead, 300,000 injured, and 
about 600,00 forcibly displaced. The main aim was to gain or retain political power.12 
Politically induced ethnic violence had characterized three of the four elections since 
1991, when the one party state ended. However, in 2007 it was more massive and 
widespread. 
After the 2007–2008 post-election violence, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in The Hague examined the situation in Kenya. This followed submissions 
from a number of human rights organizations. On March 31, 2010, the ICC’s Pre-
Trial Chamber (PTC) authorized an investigation13 into six high level individuals. 
Most were government ministers or key civil servants. Of these, two were close to 
the president. The court confirmed crimes against humanity charges against four of 
the six on January 23, 2012,14 unusually dropping the case against one defendant in 
March 2013.15 This left only three of the original ICC suspects to face trial. Two of 
the three, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, whose Kikuyu and Kalenjin 
communities were the target of each other’s alleged post-election violence in 
Kenya’s Rift Valley in 2007–2008, decided to run for president and deputy president 
in the March 2013 election, a combination that makes sense only as a counterfoil to 
the ICC. 
                                            
12  For more expansive discussions of this see the reference in fn 3 above. 
13 ICC, “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya,” No. ICC-01/09-19, 31 March 2010, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx/Kenya.  
14 ICC, “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute,” ICC-01/09-11/371, 23 January 2012, http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/ 
default.aspx/Kenya. 
15 ICC, “Prosecution Notification of Withdrawal of the Charges Against Francis Kirimi Muthaura,” 
ICC-01/09-02/11-687, 11 March 2013; and ICC, “Prosecution Observations on the Impact of the 
Withdrawal of Charges Against Mr. Muthaura on Mr. Kenyatta,” ICC-01/09-02/11-692, 13 March 
2013. 
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In January 2012, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) confirmed charges 
against Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, Deputy Minister of the cabinet, Minister of 
Finance, and the son of Kenya’s first president; Frances Muthaura, a Meru, 
Secretary to the Cabinet and a key confidant of President Mwai Kibaki; and William 
Ruto, a Kalenjin. Ruto rose to prominence as a protégé of former President Daniel 
arap Moi, later breaking from him and becoming an Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM) minister in the 2008 coalition government of President Mwai Kibaki and 
Prime Minister Raila Odinga. Later Ruto decamped from the ODM, formed his own 
party, and joined political hands with fellow defendant Uhuru Kenyatta at the end of 
2012.16 The ICC also charged Joshua Sang, a prominent Kalenjin radio announcer 
with KASS FM. The PTC failed to confirm charges against two other suspects: 
Mohammed Hussein Ali, a Somali, who was head of the police in 2007–2008, and 
Henry Kosgey, a Kalenjin ODM minister and the party’s secretary general. 
Unexpectedly, in March 2013, the ICC suddenly dropped charges against Muthaura 
when a key witness recanted his statement and admitted having received bribes.17  
The ICC’s Chief Prosecutor grouped the individuals into two cases. In one, 
the ICC accused Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang, all Kalenjin, of forming a hierarchical 
network to inflict crimes against humanity, principally against Kikuyu supporters of 
Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) in the North Rift Valley. They allegedly aimed 
to use violence to drive the PNU from power after the disputed 2007 election. In the 
other case, the ICC charged Kenyatta, Muthaura, and Ali of creating an organization 
that hired Mungiki gangs to inflict retaliatory violence against the ODM’s Luo 
supporters in Nakuru and Naivasha. The ICC alleged they had done so to retaliate 
for ODM’s anti-Kikuyu violence in the Rift and to keep Odinga from challenging the 
Kibaki presidency further after a controversial election and mass demonstrations 
against him.  
The ICC case against the Kenyan defendants is unique in three respects. It 
was the first time an ICC Prosecutor had charged perpetrators on his own volition 
(“in proprio motu”) as permitted under the Rome Statute, which governs the ICC. 
Until then, all cases had been referred to the court by the Security Council or the 
countries themselves. It was the first time the ICC had had to withdraw a case. And, 
most importantly from the standpoint of this article, it was the first time any ICC 
defendants had run for president and deputy president as part of a broader last ditch 
strategy to avoid trial. The defendants/running mates simultaneously used 
conventional legal challenges to dismiss the charges against them while mobilizing 
                                            
16 This opportunistic political alliance was not unique to this election, but characteristic of most 
Kenyan elections as parties are little more than shells for ethnic barons and are not programmatic. 
See Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,”199–202. Also Ruto had been Kenyatta’s 
campaign manager in 2002 and they had business interests together. 
17 Ibid. The defense lawyers argued the prosecution had deliberately withheld this information, 
something the latter denied. The chief prosecutor later alleged the bribers were Kenyatta supporters. 
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voters against the ICC to undercut it. Delaying tactics in The Hague were critical to 
this strategy. The two defendants, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, sought to 
ensure that the trials would not be held until after the election. They hoped to be in 
power and, if they could, to use that power to avoid trial. No one then would ever 
dare to hand them over to the ICC. Winning the 2013 presidential election thus 
became essential, as did convincing citizens of the Rift Valley that they should 
become “buddies”18 and not bother about the allegations that the ICC had accused 
their respective leaders of being “those most responsible” for killing, dislocating, 
maiming, and raping large numbers of people from each other’s Kikuyu and Kalenjin 
communities. Instead, these communities were asked to turn their vengeance 
against ODM’s Raila Odinga’s run for president, which they did.19 
Kenyan politics has obstructed the ICC in ways it could not have imagined, 
including the intimidation, bribery, and murder of witnesses on whom it had hoped to 
rely. Having naively expected the cooperation from Kenya that the Rome Statue 
required and initially having congratulated Kenya for its compliance, the ICC instead 
soon found that Kenya was undermining the court while professing cooperation. On 
multiple occasions, the ICC warned Kenya’s defendants against interfering with 
witnesses and victims. It repeatedly attempted, without success, to get the 
Government of Kenya (GOK) to assist its investigations. Instead, it found that a 
number of individuals whom it had wished to question had been killed and that other 
potential witnesses had been bribed or intimidated into silence. 
Below, I discuss the strategy and tactics used by Kenya and its defendants to 
undermine the ICC. Before this, I examine conventional theories of ratification. I find 
they do not account for Kenya’s decision to join the ICC or its questionable 
compliance with the Rome Statute. Instead I suggest that changes in political risk 
and the malleability of the rule of law do. I then explain why two of the defendants 
decided to run for president and deputy president to postpone the ICC’s run to trial 
until they gained political power and discuss the tactics they used to succeed. The 
2013 election thereby became key. My conclusion raises the Northian question of 
how much stock should be placed in ratification by countries where sanctions and 
rewards enforce informal norms that undermine formal laws including treaties. I also 
question what the electoral win of Kenyatta and Ruto, two ICC indictees, and the 
deliberate polarization of ethnicity that propelled it, says about the future of 
democracy in Kenya. 
 
 
                                            
18 Michela Wrong, “Running on Amnesia,” 13 February 2013, http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2013/02/22/kenya-election-campaign-run-on-amnesia/ (last accessed on 17 April 2003). 
19 For a discussion of why Kenyan elections have been more about voting against a person and 
an ethnic group than voting for one, see the discussion of “exclusionary ethnicity” in Mueller, “The 
Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” 201.  
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Treaty Ratification: Theories and the Kenyan Context 
Theories 
Theories abound as to why countries sign human rights treaties that limit their 
sovereignty. These theories are either not pertinent to Kenya or they do not help one 
understand Kenya’s behavior. Kenya signed the Rome Statute in 1999 under former 
President Daniel arap Moi and then ratified it in 2005 under President Mwai Kibaki. I 
argue that Kenya’s changing politics and the weakness of the rule of law explain why 
Kenya initially was in favor of the ICC and signed on to the Rome Statute before 
political circumstances changed. Kenya then turned against the court and began to 
undermine it while minimally complying with its directives. 
Dutton20 notes that many human rights treaties are sovereignty limiting but as 
they have no teeth to enforce them countries sign on; while Vreeland21 counter 
intuitively argues that strong dictatorships are more likely to support the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture as they have such a tight grip over the 
population that they do not need to torture. In examining why countries supported 
the European Convention on Human Rights after World War II, Moravcsik22 argues 
that they did so in an attempt to “lock in” new democracies like Italy, France, and 
Germany, to contain internal threats, and to keep them from reverting to fascism. 
None of these conjectures applies to the Rome Statute or to Kenya. In 
contrast to other human rights treaties the ICC’s Rome Statute has teeth.23 High 
level perpetrators including presidents are not immune from trial or warrants to arrest 
them, convicted suspects can be jailed for up to thirty years, and state parties to the 
Statute are required to arrest and hand over fugitives to the ICC, which limits the 
freedom of movement of the accused. Hence, unlike the treaties referred to by 
Dutton, the Rome Statute is serious and largely is taken seriously. Kenya is not a 
dictatorship like those described by Vreeland, and Kenya’s motive in signing was not 
to send a “lock in” signal to itself or other nascent democracies.  
Simmons and Danner, and also Chapman and Chaudoin, look more 
specifically at which sort of countries do and don’t ratify the Rome Statute and join 
                                            
20 Yvonne M. Dutton, “Commitment to the International Criminal Court: Do States View Strong 
Enforcement Mechanisms as a Credible Threat,” One Earth Foundation Working Paper, n.d., 
http://www.oneearthfuture.org/siteadmin/images/files/file_43.pdf. Also see Hathaway, “The Cost of 
Commitment.” 
21 James Vreeland, “Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the 
United Nation’s Convention Against Torture,” International Organization 2, 62 (2008), 65–101. 
22 Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origin of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Post 
War Europe,” International Organization 54, 2 (2000), 220.  
23 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (New York: United 
Nations, 1999–2002), Articles 77, 86–93, and 27–29. 
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the ICC as state parties. Simmons and Danner24 argue that ratifying countries tend 
either to be peaceful democracies or autocracies with recent histories of civil war, 
whereas those that don’t sign either are democracies engaged in wars (e.g., the 
United States, Israel) or unaccountable autocracies (e.g., China, Sudan). They 
maintain that violent autocracies sign on as a form of “credible commitment” to 
signal their enemies that they won’t revert to force again to keep their antagonists 
from doing so. Utilizing alternative measures of violence and more refined indicators 
of governance, Chapman and Chaudoin find that Simmons and Danner’s theories do 
not hold.25 Instead, they argue that, the worse a country’s scores on the rule of law 
and various governance indices, and the more violent it is, the less likely it is to ratify 
the Rome Statute. Furthermore, their data contradict many of Simmons’ and 
Danner’s other findings. Ginsburg26 also argues against Simmons and Danner. He 
maintains that a dictator’s commitment is not credible, suggesting that statistical 
outliers who ratify the Rome Statute tend to be countries pursuing “victors’ justice” 
rather than justice, a point also made by Hashimoto.27  
Neither Simmons and Danner nor Chapman and Chaudoin’s theories explain 
why Kenya ratified the Rome Statute. In terms of both theories, Kenya is an outlier 
that would not have been expected to join the ICC because of its history of violence 
in the 1990s, its mixed democratic credentials, and a judiciary that was not 
independent. Also, it was never a violent autocracy engaged in civil war as defined 
by Simmons and Danner.  
The Kenya Context 
Instead, to explain why Kenya joined the ICC and then tended to undermine it, one 
must look to the political context of the times when Kenya signed (1999) and ratified 
(2005) the Rome Statute and later after 2008 when it began to act to limit its 
cooperation. So long as support for the ICC carried little political risk, it was likely 
that Kenya would ratify and comply with the Rome Statute. Conversely, the more 
                                            
24 Beth A. Simmons and Allison Dammer, “Credible Commitment and the International Criminal 
Court,” International Organization 64, 2 (Spring 2010), 227, 231–36. 
25 Terrence L. Chapman and Stephen Chaudoin, “Ratification Patterns and the International 
Criminal Court,” International Studies Quarterly 57, 2 (June 2013), 400–409. The authors find that 
Simmons and Danner’s coding results in civil conflict scores that put the United Kingdom, Spain, 
Afghanistan, and Rwanda in the same category, and uses Freedom House measures of governance 
that are too crude to correctly categorize countries compared to alternative measures. Also, they find 
that even using Simmons and Dammer’s measures there were a number of countries that should 
have ratified the Rome Statute and did not. 
26 Tom Ginsburg, “The Clash of Commitments at the International Criminal Court,” Chicago 
Journal of International Law 9, 2 (Winter 2009), 505–506.  
27 Barry Hashimoto, “Why Do Leaders Accept the ICC’s Jurisdiction? Theory and Evidence” 
(unpublished paper, New York University, March 25, 2013), 2, 7–10, 23. 
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politically risky compliance became, (which happened once the ICC started its 
investigations and increased after the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) confirmed charges 
against six suspects, five of whom were high level government officials), the more 
likely it was that Kenya and its ICC suspects would attempt to defy rather than 
cooperate with the ICC. This argument speaks to Von Stein’s discussion of an 
endogeneity problem: countries with higher scores on governance indicators are 
more likely to ratify and comply with the Rome Statute.28 It follows that outliers like 
Kenya, with poor governance scores, would not have been expected to ratify the 
Rome Statute, or having ratified it, to halt its compliance at some point, especially 
when the political context changed.29  
When Kenya signed and ratified the Rome Statute, the ICC was still in its 
infancy. Establishing the court took time and nothing happened for several years. 
The political situation in Kenya also was improving; it appeared inconceivable, if not 
preposterous, that any Kenyan would ever be charged by the ICC. Hence, signing 
and ratifying the Statute seemed riskless. Although the Rome Statute was approved 
in July 1998, the treaty did not become binding until July 2002, following the 
ratification by sixty member states in April 2002. The ICC elected its first judges only 
in 2003. It did not undertake any investigations until 2004. This followed self-referrals 
to the ICC by Uganda and the Republic of the Congo in 2003 and 2004. The court 
issued no warrants for arrests until July 2005, when it moved against the leader of 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and the first Pre-Trial Chamber hearing did not 
take place until 2006.30 Kenya seemed miles away from the guerrilla leaders being 
prosecuted by the court, and the ICC had no convictions until that of Thomas 
Lubanga, a Congolese warlord, in 2012. Kenya’s signing of the Rome Statute 
ironically occurred in 1999 under the repressive regime of former Daniel arap Moi, 
largely due to pressure from local human rights groups. The treaty had no effect until 
it was ratified in 2005, but even then Kenya was protected by the Statute’s 
                                            
28 Jana Von Stein, “International Law: Understanding Compliance and Enforcement,” in Robert 
Denemark, ed., International Studies Compendium (Oxford, UK: Wiley Blackwells, 2010, 4159-4178.); 
Jana Von Stein, “The Engines of Compliance,” in Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack, eds., Synthesizing 
Insights from International Law and International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013, 477-501.). 
29 Hollyer and Rosendorff note the perverse results of ratification by outliers. They argue that 
dictators who ratify the Convention on Torture, then stay in power longer to protect themselves while 
Posner questions the fixation on ratification as it appears not lead to improved human rights behavior. 
See James R. Hollyer and Peter Rosendorff, “Do Human Rights Agreements Prolong the Tenure of 
Autocratic Ratifiers,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 44, 3 (Spring 
2012), 807, and Eric A. Posner, “Some Skeptical Comments on Beth Simmon’s Mobilizing for Human 
Rights, Ibid., 819–31. 
30 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court (last accessed April 16, 
2013). 
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complementarity rule: it made the ICC an international criminal court of last resort 
able to intervene legally in a state’s internal affairs only if that state was “unable or 
unwilling” to prosecute genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.31 
Furthermore, the Statute could not be applied retroactively to times before 
ratification. Hence there were no worries that the ICC would prosecute Moi and his 
supporters for instigating the violent “tribal clashes” during the 1992 and 1997 
elections.  
In the parliamentary debates of the time and among civil society activists, one 
finds no concern that any Kenyans would ever be brought before the ICC. Instead 
legislators and human rights groups thought it would benefit Kenya to sign on.32 
They were mainly concerned with delays in ratification and with reconciling the parts 
of the Kenyan constitution that gave immunity to the president, which the Rome 
Statute prohibited.33 Human rights groups worried about the possibility of Kenya 
becoming a safe haven for Rwandan genocidaires, something they wanted to guard 
against by ratifying the statute.34 Furthermore, as Obel Hansen notes, the ICC until 
recently had only targeted non-state actors and one side of a conflict, hence again 
the perceived non-relevance of the ICC to Kenya’s politicians.35 Thus, ratifying the 
Rome Statute seemed unthreatening to the political elite of the time. Also, the 
election of Mwai Kibaki as president in 2002 appeared to signal a new era in which 
human rights would be respected and an end brought to Moi’s detentions, killings, 
and torture. Beyond this, Kenyan human rights groups and parts of the GOK sought 
to counter the American Service Members Protection Act of 2002, which threatened 
countries that ratified the Rome Statute with a withdrawal of military and other U.S. 
aid.36 This is another respect in which Kenya was an outlier. Unlike most countries 
that received U.S. military aid, Kenya did not respond to the threats.37 Kenyans also 
                                            
31 Rome Statute, see Articles 17 and 18. 
32 Republic of Kenya, National Assembly Debates, November 4, 2001, 3093-4; November 20, 
2001, 3198; October 1, 2003, 2703-05. 
33 Rome Statute, see Article 27. 
34 Personal communication. 
35 Thomas Obel Hansen, “The International Criminal Court in Kenya: Three Defining Features of 
a Contested Accountability Process and Their Implications for the Future of International Justice,” 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 18, 2 (2012), 187.  
36 Julius Mokaya, “Kenya: Ratify Hague Court Treaty Kenya Urged,” The Standard, January 21, 
2005; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), “The Forum on the International 
Criminal Court and the Africa Court on Human and People’s Rights” (conference proceedings, Mount 
Kenya Safari Club, Nanyuki, Kenya, 27 to 30 October 2004), 23–24, 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Anyuki_Kenya_30_October_04.pdf (last accessed September 11, 
2013). 
37 This contrasts with Kelley’s views that norms supporting the ICC were more important than 
threats. Judith Kelley, “Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal 
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did not factor in a possible reoccurrence of the electoral violence of the 1990s. They 
saw it as a product of Moi’s regime that was unlikely to recur or, if it did, to rise to the 
level of crimes handled by the ICC. In countries where the rule of law is more 
entrenched than in Kenya, government lawyers might have asked the “what if” 
question. Whether this did not happen because of the low perceived risk or because 
laws and institutions always had been malleable and subject to the machinations of 
the political elite is an open question. Hathaway argues established democracies are 
more cautious about ratifying treaties, given the likely legal and other costs of non-
compliance.38  
Changes in Political Risk and Kenya’s Response to the ICC: Strategy and 
Tactics 
Initially, the ICC was not involved in prosecuting the perpetrators of Kenya’s post-
election violence. However, once the domestic option of establishing a hybrid special 
tribunal recommended by Kenya’s Commission of Inquiry into the Post-election 
Violence (CIPEV) failed, Kenya then went from supporting the ICC to nominally 
complying while trying to undermine it by various means. Responses to growing 
risks, discussed below, included a variety of delaying tactics to avoid any 
prosecution either domestic or international even before the ICC became involved 
and later to ensure that trials did not begin until after the 2013 election, if at all. 
Kenya used procrastination and intimidation to thwart the establishment of a special 
tribunal, thereby increasing its possible exposure to the ICC. It then engaged in 
failed attempts to apply outside pressures from the African Union and the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), and later mounted multiple frivolous legal 
challenges to admissibility and jurisdiction that were calculated to delay or halt the 
ICC process. Added to this was the violence and intimidation against victims, ICC 
witnesses, and human rights activists to make it costly for them to assist the ICC. 
Each of the sections below illustrates Hathaway’s point about how weak internal 
enforcement of the rule of law has threatened compliance.  
Procrastination: the Fate of Waki’s Special Tribunal 
Kenya’s response to the 2007–2008 post-election violence had been to appoint the 
Waki Commission of Inquiry into the Post -Election Violence (CIPEV).39 The 
recommendations of previous investigative commissions in the 1990s had come to 
                                                                                                                                       
Court and Bilateral Surrender Agreements,” American Political Science Review 101, 3 (August 2007), 
573–89. 
38 Hathaway, “The Cost of Commitment,” 15–18. Hathaway argues that a “rule of law tradition 
leads democratic nations to regard legal commitment-including treaties as binding.” Ibid., 15–16. 
39 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence 
(Nairobi: Government Printer, 2008). 
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naught.40 Perpetrators and the politicians who supported them correctly felt they had 
nothing to fear. The Waki Commission recommended that Kenya set up a hybrid 
Special Tribunal of domestic and international judges to try high-level perpetrators of 
the post-election violence. However, if it failed to do so, the CIPEV had a trigger 
mechanism: Kofi Annan was to turn over the Waki material that the CIPEV had 
entrusted to him at the end of 2008 for safekeeping to the ICC. According to the 
CIPEV’s recommendations and the agreement signed by both Kibaki and Odinga to 
implement them, M.P.s should have passed a bill to establish the tribunal by the end 
of January 2009, with the tribunal up and working by the end of February 2009. 
Instead, M.P.s defeated the bill on February 12, 2009, failing to get a quorum. Two 
later attempts to pass the bill failed as well.41 Many parliamentarians did not want a 
Special Tribunal at all: some because they thought it would try too many individuals 
or be used to settle political scores; others because they thought the tribunal would 
be corrupted politically and unwilling to try high-level perpetrators. The overall goal 
of many M.P.s was to use as many delaying tactics as possible to ensure that no 
one would ever be held accountable for the post-election violence in any venue 
whatsoever. M.P.s concurrently mocked the ICC as far off and ineffective given that 
it had tried few perpetrators and not yet convicted any. The Kalenjin MP Isaac Ruto 
quipped “don’t be vague, let’s go to The Hague,” while William Ruto said the ICC 
would take thirty years to do anything. Amidst the pretense of establishing a Special 
Tribunal while doing nothing and attempting to buy time, Kofi Annan gave the GOK 
two extensions to set up the tribunal, one until April and another until August 2009.  
By July 2009, long past the deadline for establishing the Special Tribunal, the 
Government of Kenya (GOK) sent a delegation to Kofi Annan and signed an 
agreement with the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo. The delegation 
promised to set up a special tribunal, to use “another judicial mechanism,” or, failing 
that, to self-refer the Kenya cases to the ICC by September 2009.42 Legal niceties 
and signed agreements notwithstanding, Annan finally concluded that Kenya was 
only buying time and had no intention of doing anything. He then handed over the 
Waki material to the ICC in July 2009, right after the Kenyan delegation had left. It 
included a secret envelope with the CIPEV’s names of individuals who should be 
                                            
40 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal 
Clashes in Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1999). 
41 Much of what follows comes from the daily newspapers of the time. For a detailed discussion 
of the GOK’s negative response to the Special Tribunal, see Stephen Brown with Chandra Lekha 
Siram, “The Big Fish Won’t Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-election Violence in 
Kenya,” African Affairs 111, 443 (April 2012), 244–60; and Susanne D. Mueller, “Dying to Win: 
Elections Political Violence and Institutional Decay,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29, 1 
(January 2011), 108–110. 
42 ICC, “ICC Prosecutor Supports Three-Pronged Approach to Justice in Kenya,” ICC-OTP-
20090930-PR456, 30 September 2009. 
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investigated further.43 This upped the ante and increased political risk. Using the law 
to delay had not worked.  
Things shortly became more ominous. Thugs broke into MP Gitobu 
Imanyara’s office in September 2009, after he tried once again to resurrect the bill 
for the Special Tribunal.44 Earlier, in July 2009, just after Annan’s handover to the 
ICC, two high level members of Mungiki, a Kikuyu gang alleged to have organized 
the post-election violence in Nakuru and Naivasha, were murdered. In September 
2009, Raila Odinga said he wanted local courts to try those suspected of the post-
election violence although neither he nor Kibaki had mobilized the cabinet and other 
parliamentarians to support the tribunal in parliament earlier. In the meantime, both 
William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta were already gearing up for a political response to 
the possibility of an ICC intrusion, aware that names had been named and the ICC 
had them. As a portent of things to come, by the end of October 2009, the Kalenjin 
formed a Council of Elders, later electing Ruto as its head, while Kenyatta said that 
Central Province should unite around one candidate in the next election and joined 
in complaining about the meddling of foreign countries in Kenya’s affairs. Ocampo 
then came to Kenya requesting that the government itself refer the Kenya situation 
to the ICC on November 5, 2009. When the government refused, Ocampo asked the 
ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber for permission to begin an investigation of the Kenyan 
situation. It was granted on March 31, 2010. From the standpoint of yet unnamed 
suspects this was a dire moment. The government still controlled the Kenyan 
judiciary and political interference often was the order of the day. But it did not 
control the ICC.  
More Attempts to Halt the ICC: State Mobilization of Domestic and International 
Forces against the Court 
Once the ICC began to investigate the Kenya situation, the political risk factor 
discussed above increased dramatically. Thereafter, Kenya responded by 
demonizing the ICC, mobilizing support against it both domestically and 
internationally, and arguing for trials to be held in Kenya. Kenya’s shuttle diplomacy 
to the African Union and the United Nations did not slow down the ICC’s pursuit of 
the Kenya cases as intended. However, it was effective longer term in mobilizing 
domestic support against the court in advance of the 2013 presidential election, 
thereby making it acceptable for citizens to vote for two ICC indictees for president 
and deputy president. The ICC was routinely attacked as an imperialist organization 
hostage to western interests unfairly targeting Africans. Never mind that Kenya itself 
had chosen to ratify the Rome Statute and had signed this legally binding 
agreement. Kenya now was playing to its domestic and regional audience for future 
votes and support. 
                                            
43 The CIPEV had not given the envelope to the Government of Kenya. 
44 “Gang Breaks into Imanyara’s Office,” The Standard, 17 September 2009. Also see Nancy 
Akinyi, “Bank Sues Imanyara over Sh 3m Loan,” The Standard, 15 December 2009. 
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More generally and amidst nominal cooperation, each time the ICC made 
progress, Kenya responded more negatively and with greater verve. In August 2010, 
after the ICC’s PTC had approved Ocampo’s request to begin an investigation, 
Kenya contemptuously invited Omar al Bashir, President of Sudan and an indicted 
ICC fugitive, to a celebration of the passage of Kenya’s new constitution that same 
month and then again to Kenyatta’s presidential inauguration in April 2013.45 This 
contravened the Rome Statute, which obliged Kenya to extradite Bashir. It also 
indicated how formal rules were being undermined once Kenya’s political risk 
changed and the ICC seemed less desirable.  
On December 15, 2010, in a surprise move, Ocampo named the defendants 
against whom he sought to have charges confirmed. Immediately afterwards, the 
GOK went into high gear in spite of the ICC having insisted that it was not targeting 
communities or Kenya, but six individuals. The Kenya state saw things differently, 
likely because most of those charged were high level government officials and 
ministers too close to President Kibaki for comfort.46 A few days later on December 
22, 2010, Kenyan MPs passed a motion to withdraw from the ICC, which Kibaki did 
not sign into law and in any case would not have come into effect for a year. 
Nevertheless, as Kegoro notes, both Kibaki and the GOK appeared to be shielding 
their own.47 The ICC’s evidence alleged that meetings organizing the retaliatory 
violence in Nakuru and Naivasha took place at State House, something human 
rights groups had claimed much earlier. Defense lawyers said the ICC’s evidence 
was flawed. As late as April 2012, Kibaki said he was still looking into options of 
trying the ICC suspects locally,48 raising the question of why, if unfettered justice for 
the victims was the goal. 
The GOK’s involvement kept increasing. Between 2011 and 2012, Kilonzo 
Musyoka, Kenya’s vice president, engaged in shuttle diplomacy to numerous African 
countries as well as to the African Union and the United Nations. He wanted their 
support for a deferral of the ICC’s investigation so that Kenya could try its cases in 
its own courts, an option it had previously rejected itself. In January 2011, the 
African Union said it would back Kenya’s attempts to defer investigations. The 
Security Council demurred, instead advising Kenya to initiate any challenges 
                                            
45 See Peter Ngetich and Walter Menya, “Kenya Will Not Arrest Bashir, says Kariuki,” The Star, 
9 April 2013. Bashir did not show up. In 2010 High Court Judge Nicholas Ombija had successfully 
issued a provisional warrant for Bashir’s arrest if he came to Kenya. 
46 Emwka-Mayaka Gekara, ”Why President’s Men Are Wary of ICC Case,” Daily Nation, 27 
August 2011; “What Happened at State House,” The Standard, 21 September 2011. 
47 George Kegoro, “On the Brink: Kenya and the International Criminal Court,” in Jochen 
Luckscheiter and Kirsten Mass-Albert, eds., A Fractious Relationship: Africa and the International 
Criminal Court (Capetown: Heinrich Boll Foundation Southern Africa, 2012), 18–22. 
48 Francis Mureithi, “Local Trials for ICC Suspects Still an Option, says Kibaki,” Daily Nation, 24 
April 2012. 
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through Article 19 of the Rome Statute on admissibility and jurisdiction.49 The 
sudden desire for home cooked justice, where the necessary ingredients were 
lacking, was unsettling to human rights defenders, who protested, and to victims.50  
Other attempts to return the cases to Kenya followed, as the defendants’ 
political risk increased when the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed charges against 
four of the six suspects on January 23, 2012. On April 26, 2012, the East African 
Legislative Assembly asked that the Kenyan cases be transferred to the East African 
Court of Justice (EACJ), followed by a request from the East African Community’s 
Summit of April 28, 2012, that the EACJ’s mandate be extended to include crimes 
against humanity.51 Kenyan human rights lawyers denounced both initiatives. 
Nevertheless, attempts to get the cases back to Kenya continued, particularly after 
Annex D of the confirmation charges was reclassified as public on September 28, 
2012, and revised ICC Documents Containing the Charges (DCC) were released on 
January 7, 2013. Both named lots of names, something the defendants would have 
preferred to keep under wraps,52 thus raising the stakes. Hence, as late as October 
2012, Kenya’s Attorney General Githu Muigai still insisted that the EACJ could be 
used to try the ICC cases while also making anti-ICC statements in a conference on 
the ICC in Nuremberg.53 These were not cooperative noises, especially coming from 
Kenya’s chief legal officer. More recently, on April 12, 2013, shortly after Kenya’s 
election, Kenya’s Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Koki Muli 
castigated the ICC at the General Assembly demanding that the cases be referred 
back to Kenya.54 This was followed by a rambling diatribe against the ICC in a 
memo to the Security Council on May 2, 2013 from Kenya’s Ambassador to the UN, 
                                            
49 “Kenya and the ICC,” Security Council Update Report, no. 1, 6 April 2011. 
50 Nyongo notes, “Just by thinking about initiating the process of taking a president to court, trial 
judge after judge will disqualify themselves…. A judge will be as dead as a dodo even before 
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52 See ICC, “Prosecution’s Submission of the Updated Public Redacted Version of ICC-01/09-
02/11-468D (annex D),” ICC-01/09-02/11-496, September 28, 2012, http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/ 
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53 Felix Olick, “AG Hints at Bid to Postpone ICC Cases,” The Standard, 8 October 2012. 
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Sunday Nation, 12 April 2013. As late as June, the attorney general was still trying to get the ICC to 
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Macharia Kamau. It asked for assistance in terminating the ICC’s involvement in the 
Kenya cases, something over which the Security Council, where Kenya got a chilly 
reception, had no legal power. The African Union (AU), with thirty-four ICC member 
states, then swiftly followed with a near unanimous resolution for an African pullout 
from the ICC.55 In mid-August 2013, an AU delegation went to The Hague, asking 
the ICC to refer back the cases to Kenya, where it was politely rebuffed.56 Then, in 
September 2013, following a visit by Kenya’s Foreign Minister, the AU convened a 
special summit in October to discuss a possible mass pullout by African countries.57 
An intimation of the above recalcitrance already had occurred earlier in April 
2011, when the six original ICC indictees arrived in The Hague to hear the charges 
against them. Kenyatta and Ruto, who later were to run as president and deputy 
president in March of 2013, brought numerous supporters with them. Dressed with 
caps in the color of Kenya’s flag and in a huge show of disrespect, they danced and 
sang on the steps of the ICC. This was followed by an enormous celebratory rally 
once they returned home where they were joined by Kenya’s Vice President Kilonzo 
Musyoka. Both displays were openly contemptuous of the ICC and the law. They felt 
menacing to many Kenyans. The distain for the court and the implied threats 
underpinning the rally were seen as precursors to the upcoming presidential run.58 
The message was: we and not the ICC have power and we will use it. It was another 
example of the defendants’ minimal legal cooperation amidst their nominal 
compliance of showing up to hear the charges. On multiple occasions, both then and 
afterwards, Ocampo accused the suspects of creating a climate of fear. He warned 
them, including raising the possibility of warrants for their arrest, but to no avail. 
Kenyan human rights groups dismissed all of the above, and Kenya’s international 
entreaties, as attempts to protect the ICC suspects at the expense of the victims and 
as examples of continued state impunity and lawlessness. 
                                            
55 The ICC has 122 member states; African states are close to 28 percent of the total. Only 
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Using Legal Challenges to Buy Time: Admissibility and Jurisdictional Challenges to 
the ICC 
Kenya’s new 2010 constitution originally scheduled the presidential election for 
August 2012. Kenya’s defendants adopted a two-fold strategy. The first was to use 
all legal means available to get the cases dismissed under parts of the Rome Statute 
dealing with admissibility and jurisdiction.59 This was their right as defendants. 
However, the multiple attempts challenging admissibility both by the state and by the 
individual defendants, repeating the same points and then at every point appealing 
the rulings, made it appear that the defendants, whose political risk kept increasing, 
were also trying to buy time to ensure that if the cases went to trial they would not do 
so until after the presidential election which had been moved to March 2013.60 
Second, the state quite unusually engaged in the legal challenges itself, although the 
ICC’s PTC was charging individual suspects and not the state. The GOK’s entry into 
the fray increased the possibility of non-cooperation as the stakes went up and 
compliance became more costly. In the meantime, the defendants continued to 
comply with the court nominally, even as they vilified the ICC in political rallies and 
inflammatory “prayer meetings” and protested their innocence. 
The admissibility challenges began on March 31 2011, just before the ICC 
laid out its charges against the defendants, lasting until August 31, 2012, when they 
were rejected by the Appeals Chamber.61 Under the complementarity rule of the 
Rome Statute, the ICC can only take up a case and deem it admissible if a state is 
“unable or unwilling” “genuinely” to prosecute defendants for crimes against 
humanity and the other crimes under its jurisdiction. The defendants’ lawyers argued 
that their clients were cooperating with the ICC’s PTC and that Kenya had reformed 
its courts. They submitted numerous questionable and unconvincing annexes to 
prove that Kenya was preparing for trial using a “bottom up” approach, even though  
the ICC’s approach has been to charge “those most responsible.” They asked for an 
oral status conference and for a six-month delay to get the local courts ready for 
trial. The submissions did not convince the court. They were the same objections 
that had been rejected earlier at various stages, including in the confirmation of 
charges and investigations’ decisions. The ICC argued that to invoke the 
complementarity rule the defendants had to demonstrate that there were ongoing 
trials against the same individuals for the same crimes, which was not the case. 
Instead, the court said that there was a state of “inactivity.” It ruled that the appeals 
did not show that there were legal problems with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s rulings on 
                                            
59 See Rome Statute, Articles 17, 18, and 19. 
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61 Due to limitations of space it is not possible to list all the submissions that are available on the 
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admissibility and accused the defense instead of challenging the evidence, 
something that could only be done at trial. It also suggested that the challenges were 
frivolous stating that while complementarity was enshrined in the Rome Statute, it 
was not meant to be at the expense of ignoring justice for crimes covered by it.  
The defendants simultaneously mounted another set of challenges, both in 
the Pre-Trial Chamber and in the Appeals Court, this time questioning whether the 
ICC had jurisdiction over the Kenya cases. The jurisdictional challenges began in 
August and September 2011, before the confirmation of charges decision of January 
23, 2012, followed by challenges to the ruling that were finally rejected by the ICC’s 
Appeals Court on May 24, 2012.62 The defendants argued the cases did not meet 
the threshold for crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute. They claimed the 
crimes were ordinary crimes committed spontaneously rather than in pursuit of a 
“state or organizational policy” as required by the Rome Statute. Here the defense 
invoked Judge Hans Peter Kaul’s earlier minority opinions in the Pre-Trial Chamber 
in which he had objected to the ICC beginning an investigation in Kenya or 
confirming charges against the suspects. Like Kaul, the defendants’ lawyers said 
that the crimes committed had to be in pursuit of a state or organizational policy that 
threatened humanity and that if it were an organization it had to be “state-like” and 
not just what Kaul had termed ephemeral “alliances of convenience” or ethnic gangs.  
The ICC’s charges against the subjects said that they were parts of 
hierarchical organizations and networks that organized, financed, and executed 
crimes against humanity. The defense claimed they were not and attacked the 
credibility of the witnesses who had testified that the suspects were part of any 
organization. The defense, while proclaiming innocence, said that the organization 
had to be “state-like” even though this phrase is not used in the Rome Statute. Both 
this and the attacks on the credibility of witnesses were rejected. The PTC 
maintained that the crimes committed were grave enough to be considered crimes 
against humanity, were organized enough to fall under the Rome Statute’s rubric of 
“organizational policy,” which the PTC was clearly not interested in defining down, 
and that disputes over evidence and witnesses would have to be resolved at trial. 
The admissibility and jurisdictional challenges combined bought the defendants over 
a year’s worth of time, from March 2011 until August 2012. As these challenges 
continued, the defendants simultaneously were engaged in confirmation of charges 
hearings in September 2011. During the hearings and later in the final Document 
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Containing Charges (DCC), the prosecution named more high-level names on both 
sides and gave more information about alleged meetings at State House and 
elsewhere. The confirmation of charges hearings followed summonses to the 
defendants to hear the charges against them in April 2011. That ultimately resulted 
in charges being confirmed against four of the six suspects in January 2012, 
followed by a set of unsuccessful appeals. Throughout this period the defense 
mounted other challenges, which delayed the court. This included asking for several 
status conferences and oral hearings, while unsuccessfully attempting to turn the 
confirmation hearings into mini trials. In November 2012, the defense petitioned to 
get the trials moved from The Hague and closer to home in Nairobi or Arusha. This 
frightened witnesses and victims who understood the long reach of the Kenya state. 
The request, which seemed impossible at the time, also tied up the ICC’s courts, 
contributed to more delays, and threatened justice.63  
Once the above legal and delaying tactics were exhausted, trials seemed to 
be assured, with the only remaining options to defeating the ICC being to avoid trial 
by running for election to the highest executive offices while continuing to intimidate 
and attack witnesses. The defense’s procrastination nevertheless was effective in 
ensuring that if trials took place they would be after rather than before the election as 
originally scheduled. The defendants succeeded. Later they continued to mount a 
series of successful petitions to delay the trials further. Having initially been 
postponed from April until May and July 2013, additional defense appeals were 
successful in getting Ruto and Sang’s trials delayed until September 2013, and 
Kenyatta’s until November 2013 and then once again until February 2014. Each 
delay was in part the result of witness intimidation. This occasioned the need for new 
witnesses, opening up the prospect of more witness intimidation and more delays. 
Going After Potential Witnesses: Leave None to Tell the Story 
Indicative of attempts to undermine the treaty signed by the GOK were the plethora 
of attacks against witnesses. This included intimidating, bribing, and killing them. 
The message being sent both by the state, which did nothing to protect witnesses 
and victims as required by the Rome Statute, and allegedly by the defendants and 
their supporters, was that if individuals cooperated with the ICC’s investigations, they 
would pay heavy costs. Many did. As each trial date neared, more witnesses 
dropped out, thereby forcing the ICC to find others. In short, Northian-like sanctions 
worked. This compelled the defense to ask for more time to review the new 
evidence, precipitating a vicious circle of delays and the need for more witnesses 
and more time. This tactic fed into the larger strategy discussed earlier and is 
consistent with the theme of this paper. Politics began to trump the law as the 
defendants’ political risk increased.  
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Early on it appears there was a plan to eliminate, intimidate, and bribe people 
who knew too much about the 2007–2008 post-election violence, key individuals 
who were part of it, and civil society activists who were assisting and sheltering 
potential witnesses. Leaving none to tell the story was an apparent tactic used to get 
rid of key witnesses while simultaneously attacking the credibility of others. The aim 
was to get the cases dropped for lack of evidence even before the ICC’s 
investigation began and charges were confirmed. Later, it was to destroy the 
credibility of other witnesses who remained and to delay or halt the onset of trials 
both before and after the 2013 presidential election. Some key examples follow. 
Leaving none to tell the story began as an early preemptive measure even 
before the Waki Commission or the ICC entered the picture. Shortly after the end of 
the post-election violence, on March 8, 2008, Virginia Nyakio was murdered in a 
particularly bloody slaying. Nyakio was the wife of Mungiki’s leader Maina Njenga 
who was head of Mungiki,64 Kenya’s premier violent gang, but had been in jail 
during the post-election violence. Nyakio might have known too much about 
Mungiki’s involvement in the retaliatory violence in Nakuru and Naivasha or have 
played a part in it herself. Two months later on July 6, 2008, Maina Diambo, 
Mungiki’s Nairobi Coordinator, was murdered.65 On November 5, 2009, on the same 
day the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor said he would ask the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber to 
begin an investigation, Maina Njenga’s deputy, Njuguna Gitau, was shot dead on 
Lithuli Avenue in Nairobi shortly after Njenga left jail.66 In March 2009, two members 
of the Oscar Foundation, a human rights organization, Oscar Kamau King'ara and 
John Paul Oulu, were killed in cold blood, a month after speaking to Philip Alston, 
the UN’s Special Representative on Extra-Judicial Killings, about the murder of 
Mungiki members. In a May 2010 U.S Government Wikileaks cable, the United 
States discussed “the steady rise in the number of individuals threatened or killed for 
apparent political reasons.” It said that former Waki Commission witnesses “ha[d] 
already been threatened.”67 The cable also spoke about the embassy’s “multiple 
sources” who accused Kenyatta and Ruto of “directing a campaign of intimidation 
against potential witnesses.” It also alleged that Njuguna Gitau “may have been the 
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lynchpin to channel funding from Uhuru Kenyatta to the Mungiki.”68 In the ICC’s 
Confirmation of Charges Hearings in September 2011, the prosecutor noted that the 
above murders sought to eliminate individuals who had led the retaliatory attacks in 
Nakuru and Naivasha to keep them from implicating the organizers of the violence.69 
The campaign to silence key potential ICC witnesses intensified immediately 
after Ocampo asked the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber for permission to start a formal 
investigation in Kenya in December 2009, signaling a clear change in political risk.70 
Civil society activists complained of witness intimidation. They cited unexplained 
disappearances, enticements to study abroad, and harassment by the National 
Security Intelligence Service (NSIS). They spoke of death threats to them and their 
families, also citing menacing telephone calls and text messages.71 A number of 
targeted witnesses went to the Kenya National Commission of Human Rights 
(KNCHR) for protection. The Commission’s vice chairman, Hassan Omar, attempted 
to help, but witnesses claimed they were in danger because a former KNCHR official 
had “leaked their testimonies.”72 In October 2009, both Omar and Ken Wafula, a 
human rights lawyer, alleged harassment for having sheltered and helped 
witnesses.73 In March 2010, the director of the International Center for Policy and 
Conflict, Ndungu Wainaina, who had worked with the ICC, spoke about his 
ransacked office and “anonymous threats.”74 Oku Kaunya, the head of the 
Administration Police (APs) Training College, where 1,600 AP police attended a 
controversial program training APs as election agents in 2007, also suffered. In 
2010, he said he was being followed and threatened, went into hiding, and then left 
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the country.75 Before that, a police officer, Bernard Kiriinya, who had spoken to the 
KNCHR about the secret Kwekwe police squad’s killing of Mungiki members, was 
gunned down in Nairobi in cold blood.76 
The threats and attacks against potential and actual witnesses made the 
ICC’s work increasingly difficult. Witnesses kept bowing out as each trial date 
neared and the pressure on them intensified something that continues up to now.77 
In 2011, two individuals sheltered by Hassan Omar claimed he had bribed them and 
recanted their statements to the KNCHR and to the Waki Commission.78 Much later 
in 2013, the ICC’s witness no. 8, in the Ruto case, used the same language and 
made similar allegations. He cited bribery by the ICC and retracted statements he 
had made both to the court and to the Waki Commission.79 Earlier, his family in 
Kenya said they were being harassed.80The ICC itself had to drop its witness no. 4, 
in the Kenyatta case. Fatou Bensouda, the ICC’s chief prosecutor said he had lied 
and received bribes from agents of Uhuru Kenyatta. Bensouda then dropped the 
ICC’s case against Frances Muthaura in March 2013.81 Muthaura’s lawyers accused 
the ICC of withholding exculpatory evidence and said that the ICC’s problem was 
that it never had a case. Bensouda retorted by mentioning other factors: lack of 
cooperation from the GOK, the intimidation of other potential witnesses who were 
too afraid to testify, and unnamed deaths. Kenya’s attorney general filed a 
submission to the ICC’s trial chamber rejecting Bensouda’s claims.82 One could cite 
                                            
75 Bewnsen Amadala and Ouma Wanzala, “Poll Violence: What Does This Man Know?” Daily 
Nation, 20 March 2010. 
76 http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/pdfs/2009/03/Whistleblowers_signed_statement.pdf; http:// 
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/extrajudicial-killings-kenya. More recently, a number of 
members of the ex-Kwekwe police squad, who are thought to have “vital information on the 
2007/2008 post-election violence” have been murdered or are missing. Hudson Gumbihi, “Ex-
Kwekwe Killer Cops Fear for Their Lives,” Standard, August 8, 2013, and Cyrus Ombati, “Mystery 
Deaths of Elite Police Officers,” Standard, August 5, 2013. 
77 Space limitations preclude listing numerous other examples of this. 
78 Ramadhan Rajab, “I Am Ready to Set the Record Straight on Witness Coaching Claims at 
ICC-Hassan Omar,” The Star, 26 September 2011. 
79 “ICC Statement,” http://www.dennisitumbi.com, March 23, 2013 (last accessed March 26, 
2013).  
80 Mathews Ndanyi, “ICC Witness Family Flee to Eldoret,” The Star, 27 September 2011; “Son 
in Danger, Claims Ex-ICC Witness’ Father,” Daily Nation, 25 March 2013; “Kenya: ICC Witness Who 
Recanted Evidence Speaks Out,” Capital FM, http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/03/icc-witness-
who-recanted-ruto-evidence-speaks-out/, March 23, 2013. 
81 “Uhuru Men Bribed ICC Witness 4,” The Star, 28 February 2013. 
82 ICC, “Government of Kenya’s Submission on the Status of Cooperation with the International 
Criminal Court,” ICC-01/09-02/1173, April 9, 2013, http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/ 
24    Susanne D. Mueller 
 
numerous other examples of attacks and intimidation against ICC witnesses and the 
resulting delays that have ensued.  
Since the 2013 election, there has been an increase in witness defection and 
worries about witness elimination. Witnesses are aware of the massive and powerful 
security apparatus normally available to Kenya’s presidents.83 Recent events 
suggest that time is not on their side. More witnesses have dropped out since the 
election.84 This includes ninety-three victims, described as vulnerable by their 
lawyer.85 In mid-July 2013, three other ICC witnesses in the Kenyatta case also 
withdrew, citing security concerns. They included: fear for themselves, their families, 
“insurmountable security risks” “too great to bear,” and worries about attempts to 
locate them.86 Following this, Ruto upped the ante by asking the prosecution for 
“screening notes” of ICC interviewees who were not even witnesses. Bensouda 
claimed this would jeopardize their safety.87 More recently, Kenyatta’s lawyers have 
requested the cell phone records of 60 witnesses from local Kenyan carriers, whose 
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licenses are up for renewal.88 The overall intent has been to discourage any 
communication with the ICC and to strangle the court as the trial dates neared.89 
The tactic is succeeding. Four witnesses in the Ruto Sang trial suddenly withdrew in 
mid-September 2013 just one day before they were to testify, allegedly leading to an 
unscheduled postponement.90 A day later another quit right before she was to testify 
in the Ruto trail, citing fear and lack of security.91 This followed the outing of the first 
trial witness in social media. The ICC then called for her testimony to be held in 
camera and for special protection for witnesses. The ICC’s Chief Prosecutor said her 
office had uncovered evidence of intimidation and bribery by politicians, lawyers and 
businessmen who were doing to great lengths to cover their tracks and could face 
charges.92 Unlike domestic courts in advanced democracies, the ICC cannot 
effectively counter witness intimidation apart from issuing arrest warrants against the 
defendants and others.93  
On October 1, 2013, the ICC issued its first warrant against Walter Baraza, a 
Kenyan journalist charged with bribing three witnesses in the Ruto case. The ICC’s 
Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda claimed Baraza was “acting in furtherance of a 
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criminal scheme devised by a circle of officials within the Kenyan administration”. 
Bensouda, said the warrant was “an opportunity for the Kenyan an government to 
demonstrate the cooperation they say they have been giving to the ICC.”94 The 
response of Kenya’s Attorney General was to ask Kenya’s High Court to make a 
determination on the request. Legal experts called this evasive and said Kenya was 
legally obliged to hand over Baraza. Furthermore, continued intimidation amidst 
inadequate witness protection still invites more dropouts and could be the death 
knell of the trials.95 Both examples illustrate the paper’s argument about the low cost 
of non-compliance with treaties where the rule of law is weak and malleable.  
 
The Mega Strategy: Winning the Election and Becoming President 
Winning The Election 
Kenyatta and Ruto understood that political power mattered and acted to win it. They 
used Kenya’s ethnic polarization to fuel internal ethnic solidarity among their Kikuyu 
and Kalenjin co-ethnics against Raila Odinga, their Luo presidential opponent and 
Ruto’s former political ally in 2007. They also attacked the ICC as an anti-African, 
colonial, western institution, and painted themselves as its victims.96 They claimed 
Odinga was behind the 2007–2008 violence, had deserted the Kalenjin, and was 
supporting the ICC to eliminate them as political competitors.97 They accused the 
ICC and the West of unfairly going after their communities, after them personally, 
and of interfering in Kenya’s elections.98 Hence, demonizing the ICC became a way 
of solidifying ethnic polarization, thereby turning the 2013 election into another zero 
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sum ethnic contest. The result was another display of “exclusionary ethnicity”: voting 
against the other, in part out of fear, more than for one’s own.99  
The ICC initially received strong support, but this soon changed. Once the 
ICC named, summoned, and charged suspects, the approval ratings dropped, 
particularly in Central Province and in the Rift Valley, the heartlands of the accused. 
In October 2010, before the names of the defendants came out, 68 percent of the 
country wanted the ICC to prosecute the suspects, including 73 percent in Central 
Province and 61 percent in the Rift Valley.100 By February 2012 total support fell to 
60 percent overall and to only 42 percent in Central Province and 50 percent in the 
Rift Valley. This compared unfavorably to support for the ICC of 75 percent and 74 
percent in Coast and Nyanza provinces, Odinga strongholds.101 To capture more 
votes, Odinga also changed his tune on the ICC; he promised he would bring the 
Kenyan cases home.102 Kenyatta, in turn, said that if he won the election it would be 
a referendum by Kenyans against the ICC and the process that had brought him 
there.103 As of November 2012, 27 percent and 37 percent of those polled in Central 
and Rift Valley Provinces said the defendants should contest the election and then 
ignore the ICC trials.104 In late February 2013, just before the election, 49 percent 
said they wanted the trials to take place in The Hague and 46 percent in East 
Africa.105 By mid-July 2013, only 39 percent of those polled wanted trials to be in 
The Hague, falling to only 7 percent in Central Province and 24 percent in Rift Valley 
Province, compared to 70 percent in Nyanza.106 
Winning the presidential election was the final solution to keeping the ICC at 
bay. Ruto’s and Kenyatta’s strategy and their various time buying tactics worked. 
They managed to gain power before the ICC trials began. Their tactics solidified 
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domestic and regional support, putting more pressure on witnesses, and on the ICC 
itself. Once Kenyatta and Ruto won the election they added another tactic to insulate 
themselves from the court; they argued for exceptional accommodation based on 
their newly acquired political powers as president and deputy president. 
 
Another Tactic: Using Political Power to Gain Concessions from the ICC 
Since the election, the defendants have used their political victory to gain more 
delays and other concessions from the court. They have proved adept at using the 
law to undermine the law not only domestically, as Hathaway might predict, but also 
internationally. The ICC’s Trial Chamber agreed to postpone the cases against Ruto 
and Kenyatta until September and November 2013. Then, in a contentious decision 
in mid-June 2013, based on an April plea, the Trial Chamber (TC) ruled that Ruto did 
not need to be physically present at trial continuously, as required by the Rome 
Statute and instead could just show up at key points.107 The judgment conceded that 
Ruto’s position as Deputy President justified his not being present in court full time. It 
vindicated the defendants’ belief that political power mattered and that their strategy 
was working. The decision also dumbed down the Rome Statute’s definition of 
exceptional and temporary circumstances when defendants might be excused from 
being physically present in court. A week earlier, the Trial Chamber unexpectedly 
recommended that, subject to a vote of all judges, parts of the Ruto trial should be 
held in Arusha or in Nairobi, although this would compromise the safety of 
witnesses.108 On July 15, 2013 a plenary vote by ICC judges overruled the Trial 
Chamber, concluding that the Ruto Sang trials must take place in The Hague.109 A 
month and a half later, on August 20, 2013, the Appeals Chamber issued a 
suspensive order compelling Ruto to attend the trials continuously until it made its 
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final ruling.110 On September 30, 2013, Ruto asked for the ruling to be reconsidered, 
and once again to be excused from attending his trial. Both pleas failed111. However, 
the Trial Chamber’s (TCs) willingness to entertain these requests at all appeared to 
accommodate political power. It also bought the defense months to unsettle 
witnesses, victims, and human rights activists.112 
Ultimately in late October 2013, the Appeals Chamber (AC), overturned the 
TC’s decision that Ruto would not be required to be physically present at trial 
continuously and only at key points. It argued that physical presence was the rule, 
but in contrast to the prosecution it stated that the TC had the discretion to make 
limited and strictly necessary exceptions on a case by case basis113. This 
challenged a stricter interpretation of the Rome Statute and thereby opened up a 
Pandora’s Box of other possible political pleas by the defendants. Similar requests 
by Kenyatta still were still pending at the time of the Ruto decision. This included a 
late plea to exempt Kenyatta from attending his own trial at The Hague. The grounds 
were presidential power. The prosecutor said the request was “disrespectful” and 
that failure to attend could generate an arrest warrant.114 On October 13, 2013 
Kenyatta’s Trial Chamber (TC) made a partial concession. In a two to one decision, 
it conditionally excused him from being physically present in court except at key 
sessions.115 On November 26, 2013, it reversed this ruling in conformity with the 
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AC’s decision in the Ruto case that physical presence must be the norm.116 
Kenyatta lawyers also made simultaneous pleas for his case to be dropped entirely. 
They claimed that at least three of the prosecution’s witnesses were tainted and had 
harassed and attempted to bribe defense witnesses, arguments that were raised 
earlier and overruled. The defense also asked that Kenyatta’s trail be postponed 
until February 12, 2014 to investigate their claims.117 The Trial Chamber agreed to 
delay the case until February 5, 2014. The prosecution also consented. It said it 
needed more time to prepare three new witnesses who were added to replace 
others who had dropped out earlier. However, it said the case was not tainted, 
should go to trial and also claimed to have tape recordings of attempts to intimidate 
and bribe its witnesses that began just a few days after it released their names to the 
defense.118 Jointly, these initial pleas to and decisions of the ICC’s Trial Chambers, 
and their consideration of other frivolous defense requests for trials by video 
conferencing, reinforced the view that the defendants and the Kenyan state were 
gaining traction and that political power mattered more than the law. This included a 
ruling that the trials of Kenyatta and Sang would not take place simultaneously, but 
in blocks of four weeks on and off for each, opening up the option of not returning to 
The Hague.119 It is now unclear who is on trial: the ICC or the indictees accused of 
crimes against humanity. 
As his trial date has neared, Kenyatta increasingly has used his political 
authority to insulate himself from the law. This supports the argument of this paper 
about how attempts to undermine the ICC and manipulate the law have worked in 
tandem with increasing political risk. After the terrorist attack on the Westgate Mall in 
Nairobi, Kenyatta called the ICC a “toy of declining imperial powers” engaged in 
“race-hunting”120 implying that he might not show up for trial. He enlisted the African 
Union (AU) to call a special summit to engineer a mass pullout from the ICC on 
                                                                                                                                       
of Judge Ozaki, ICC-01/09-02/11-830 and 830-Anx 2, October 18, 2013 and par. 122, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx/Kenya. 
116 See ICC-01/09-02/11-863, November 26, 2013. Had it not reversed its previous decision, 
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117ICC, “Defence Application to Vacate the 12 November 2013 Date for the Commencement of 
Trial, ICC-01/09-02/11-835-Red, October 25, 2013, http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/ 
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118 See ICC, “Public Redacted Version of the Prosecution’s 1 November 2013 Opposition to the 
Defense Application for a Permanent Stay of Proceedings,” ICC-01-02/11-848-Red, November 11, 
2013, p. 16, http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx/Kenya. 
119 This followed a threat by Kenyatta not to cooperate if his and Ruto’s trials were conducted at 
the same time. See Gideon Keter “Uhuru Warns of Non-Cooperation,” The Star, September 9, 2013. 
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October 11-12, 2013, just a month before his upcoming trial. This failed with only 
fourteen out of fifty-four heads of state attending and disinterest by most countries in 
North, West, and South African. Instead, the AU passed motions saying African 
heads of state should be given immunity from the ICC and the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) should defer the Kenyatta case. The grounds for the proposal were that 
Kenyatta’s absence would constitute a threat to peace and security, with possible 
adverse implications for the West in gaining Kenya’s cooperation in joint anti-terrorist 
activities in the wake of the Westgate attacks. However, a November 15, 2013, 
African Union resolution to the UNSC requesting a one-year deferral under Article 16 
of the UN Charter failed.121  
Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s response to the AU was that: “African leaders 
behind the move to extract the continent from the jurisdiction of the [ICC] are … 
seeking a licence to kill, maim and oppress their people without consequence. They 
are saying African leaders should not allow the interests of the people to get in their 
way of their personal ambitions. Being held to account interferes with their ability to 
act with impunity…. They are arguing that the golden rule … should not apply to 
them. And nor should any legal system.”122 Tutu’s points further reinforce the 
argument here concerning non-compliance in the face of increasing political risk and 
the malleability of the rule of law.  
Later at the ICC’s meeting of state parties from November 20–28, 2013, 
delegates passed amendments to the ICC’s rules and procedures that directly 
benefited Kenyatta and Ruto and responded to pressures from Kenya and the AU. 
The amendments allow for trials by video link and for high level defendants with 
“extraordinary public duties” to be represented by their lawyers rather than showing 
up for trial as required in the Rome Statute.123 Although absences must be 
requested and are meant to be the exception rather than the rule, it appears that 
politics and political power have trumped the law once again. The amendments 
contradict articles 63 and 27 of the Rome Statute’s requiring physical presence and 
equality before the law, irrespective of whether the defendant is a high level political 
                                            
121  Eight members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. abstained with seven members 
voting in favor of the resolution, including Togo, Rwanda, Morocco, China, and Russia. Previously 
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Council Rejects AU Bid for Suspension of Kenyan ICC Trial,” Daily Nation, November 15, 2013. 
122 “Pulling Out of the ICC would be Tragic for Africa-Desmond Tutu,” Ghana Web, October 13, 
2013, http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=289018 (last ac-
cessed October 18, 2013). Others view the AU as “a forum of elite solidarity for self-preservation…, 
[and] 3as a club for dictators. Solomon Ayele Dersso-ISS, “The AU’s ICC Summit: A Case of Elkite 
Solidarity for Self Preservation?” October 17, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201310150956.html 
(last accessed October 18, 2013). 
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figure. The passage of these amendments is likely to be followed by pleas and 
counter pleas in the Trial and Appeals Chambers. At the very least this will delay the 
cases further in keeping with the defense’s strategy and tactics discussed 
throughout this paper. 
 
Conclusion 
 “Only laws and treaties that are enforced impose any order.”124 (September 2013) 
“[President Kenyatta] has cooperated fully with the court up until now….Are the 
circumstances different? Absolutely. Totally. Completely different. Before he wasn’t 
the head of the state of the republic….”125 (October 16, 2013) 
Kenya’s relations with the ICC have followed a predictable path. As political 
risk increased, so did Kenya’s and its defendants’ attempts to undermine the ICC 
and the Rome Statute which it had ratified in less perilous times. Winning the 2013 
presidential election and using the tactics outlined above were key to that end. The 
inapplicability of many theories dealing with ratification and compliance suggests 
that both might be better understood by invoking North and Hathaway. North clarifies 
how informal norms and enforcement mechanisms often trump adherence to formal 
rules.126 Hathaway explains why the low cost of commitment in systems where the 
rule of law is not entrenched encourages treaty ratification and jeopardizes 
compliance.127 Both imply that politics can and does intrude on the law. Politics and 
political risk change. Hence, unlike ratification, compliance is a process, a point 
made above but not acknowledged in the literature. The Kenyan cases make this 
and the resilience of the past, increasingly clear. Kenya’s politically powerful 
defendants are still attempting to use their might to insulate themselves from the ICC 
and the law. On September 5, 2013, just five days before the beginning of the Ruto 
and Sang trials, Kenya’s parliament passed a motion to withdraw from The Hague 
as they had done in 2010. Although this does not affect Kenya’s ongoing cases,128 
parliament also threatened to repeal the International Crimes Act of 2008, which 
                                            
124 “Leader,” The Economist, September 13–17, 2013. 
125 Kenya Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed quoted in “Africa vs ICC: Quotes on Court Before 
Kenya Trial,” The Associated Press, October 16, 2013. 
126 See North, “Economic Change through Time.” If individuals who cooperate with the ICC are 
sanctioned cooperation becomes costly, thereby creating perverse incentives that support non 
compliance. 
127 See Hathaway, “The Cost of Commitment.” 
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domesticated the Rome Statute in Kenya.129 Once again, this illustrates the 
perceived malleability of the rule of law and the belief that politicians are above it 
rather than subject to it. Furthermore, the decision of 100 Kenyan M.P.s to join Ruto 
in The Hague and dance on its steps when his trial began is a throwback to similar 
political drumbeating in 2011 as was their request for Kenyatta and Ruto to be given 
VIP treatment there.130 Neither acknowledged the reality that the defendants are 
criminal suspects accused of grave crimes. Nor does the continued intimidation and 
bribery of witnesses. 
 Earlier sections of this paper raise five questions that go beyond the Kenyan 
case: first, about the viability of treaties signed by countries where the rule of law is 
still malleable and subject to being undermined; second, about the extent of 
cooperation the ICC can expect from member states and high profile defendants 
whose political risk has increased; third, about the increased difficulties for the ICC 
in conducting successful investigations and winning cases amidst such high levels of 
recalcitrance; fourth, about whether formal rules, including treaties and constitutions, 
are likely to have any greater salience than in the past; and fifth, about whether 
future high powered defendants at the ICC will invoke Kenya’s strategy of running 
for president and use similar tactics to deflect the court and insulate themselves from 
it.131  
The paper also advances some insights about the interplay between politics 
and the law, including the role of elections. The ICC insists, like other judiciaries, that 
it is not influenced by politics, but by the law. In the Kenya cases, however, both the 
state and the defendants’ responses to the ICC led to politics intruding upon the law. 
The defendants have used strategies of delay, mobilization of regional support, and 
alleged intimidation by supporters successfully to win the 2013 presidential election 
and to postpone their trials until after they gained power. Since then, the ICC has 
had to deal with this “fait accompli” and attempts to frustrate the court with more 
                                            
129 The ICC lawyer prosecuting the case said the effect of the motions was to intimidate 
witnesses who worried that their cooperation might be deemed illegal if the pullout took effect. Nzau 
Musau and Oliver Mathenge, “Transfer Uhuru, Ruto ICC Cases to Kenya-China,” Daily Nation, 
September 18, 2013. 
130 Oliver Mathenge and Gideon Keter, “MPs to Spend Sh. 84 Million in Hague,” The Star, 
September 4, 2013, and Geoffrey Mosoku, “Jubilee MPs Want VIP Treatment for Uhuru Kenyatta and 
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delays and pleas by Kenyatta and Ruto for exceptional privileges based on their 
status. One result is that some of the Trial Chamber’s recent decisions seemed to 
accommodate the political power of individuals accused of very grave crimes.132 
This suggests a divided court under siege by its defendants and under pressure. It 
highlights the ICC’s limited enforcement powers when political power and non-
compliance combine to threaten the law. It raises questions about the efficacy of 
international criminal law and some of the ICC’s own decisions and procedures.133 
Kenya’s 2007 victims predictably feel a “growing loss of faith in the ICC” and that 
“justice is slowly fading away.”134 
Otherwise, Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s need to win power to stave off the ICC not 
only has increased the saliency of Kenya’s presidency, but also has reduced 
Kenya’s democratic space. Kenya’s Chief Justice received threats before a high 
court decision on whether the two indicted defendants would be allowed to run for 
president.135 He also has said his email accounts are being hacked.136 Civil society 
activists who defend the ICC and tried to protect its witnesses are routinely hounded, 
and journalists are more cautious than before, particularly since the passage of a 
draconian new media law and another law which would restrict NGO access to 
foreign funds.137 Kenya, like a number of other African countries, continues to 
                                            
132 For a discussion of this, see Olick and Jennings, “Kenya Concern as ICC Lets Kenyan Vice 
President Skip Court Appearances,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 8 July 2013, http:// 
allafrica.com/stories/200501200670.html. 
133 The ICC has discussed possible internal reforms. See Paul Ogemba, “ICC to Adopt New Probe 
Strategies,” Daily Nation, October 28, 2013. Also see ICC: Strategic Plan: June 2012-June 2015, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/policies%20and%20str
ategies/Documents/OTP-Strategic-Plan-2012-2015.pdf.  
134 ICC, “Victims Response to the Defense Observations on Estimated Time Required to 
Prepare for Trial,” ICC-01/09-02/11-752, 6 June 2013, 6. 
135 Isiah Lucheli, “CJ Got Threats over Uhuru Ruto Case,” The Standard, 20 February 2013; “CJ 
Raises Concern over Threats to Judges,” The Star, 2 February 2013. 
136 Lydia Matata, “Kenya: CJ Mutunga says Email, Twitter Account Hacked,” The Star, 
September 27, 2013. 
137 John Githongo, “Whither Civil Society?” The Star, 6 April 2013; Dave Opiyo, “Stop 
Intimidating Civil Society-Groups,” The Nation, April 3, 2013. Around the time of the election a 
menacing flyer entitled “Evil Empire,” designed as a family tree with pictures of key civil society 
activists and arrows indicating their interconnections. Since then, civil society and human rights 
organizations have voiced concerns about possible attempts to cut off their funding. See Suba 
Churchill, “Why the Public Benefits Act Makes NGOs Jittery,” The Star, 10 June 2013. Also see David 
Mwere and Gideon Keter, The Star, “M.P.s Pass Bill to Gag Media, November 1, 2013, and “NGOs 
Oppose New Bill to regulate Foreign Funding, The Star, November 4, 2013. 
138 Catherine Boone, “Electoral Populism Where Property Rights Are Weak: Land Politics in 
Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa,” Comparative Politics 41, 2 (January 2009), 183–96. 
Kenya and the International Criminal Court     35 
 
display an impressive ability to reinvent the status quo: operating within the 
architecture of a multi-party system while behaving in ways that are often 
reminiscent of a one party state, something noted by Boone in her discussions of the 
Cote d’Ivoire.138The use of the carrot and stick is still at work.139 Northian-like 
enforcement mechanisms punish rather than reward attempts to support the law and 
assist the ICC. This reinforces Hathaway’s argument that where basic freedoms are 
not “well protected,” enforcement suffers, and noncompliance “can be relatively cost-
free.”140 This correctly implies what North terms “path dependence”141: the resilience 
and repetition of the past in the face of informal norms and enforcement 
mechanisms that guide decision makers and undermine formal changes. This 
explains Kenya’s response to the ICC, its internal political dynamics, and the 
unusual salience of the 2013 election. Business as usual is still at work. It also may 
be that where defendants gain high-level political power and control the arms of 
government, treaties such as the Rome Statute are condemned to follow and not 
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